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Abstract 
In 2004, an unnamed Bush adviser accused a senior Wall Street Journal reporter of belonging to the “reality 
based community”—a community that believed solutions stem from the judicious study of reality.  “We're 
history's actors”, he told the journalist, “and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” 
Overwhelmingly, the response of those on the left, and of US progressives to this comment was to smugly 
deride the irrationalism and the arrogance of the Bush Administration. This paper, in contrast, will examine 
what is missed in the rush to accept membership of the reality based community. It will suggest that the 
advisor's comments express something that was once a central tenet of the left: the belief that political action is 
capable of transforming reality. Today, on the left, this belief has been all but abandoned in the face of a 
seemingly unstoppable onslaught of free market capitalism and increasingly repressive state power. This paper 
will ask what it would mean today to begin to re-imagine political action as capable of remaking the world. 
 
In 2004, an unnamed Bush advisor accused a senior Wall Street Journal reporter of belonging 
to the “reality based community”. This ‘community’, according to the adviser, is made up of 
people who “believe that solutions arise from your judicious study of reality.” Not realising 
he was being insulted, the reporter nodded at this description of himself and made some 
reference to enlightenment principles and empiricism. Before he could finish, the Bush aide 
interrupted him. 
 “That's not the way the world really works anymore,” he said. ''We’re an empire now, and 
when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously, 
as you will –we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s 
how things will sort out. We’re history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just 
study what we do” (Suskind 2004). 
 
Overwhelmingly, US progressives responded to this anecdote by smugly deriding the 
irrationalism and the arrogance of the Bush administration. Bloggers emblazoned “proud 
member of the reality based community” across their banners; Wikipedia suggested the 
phrase could form the rallying call for disparate opponents of the Bush administration. 
 
As the years, and the Iraq war, dragged on, the ability of the US to drop its version of reality 
on the world from a stealth bomber began to look tenuous. In Iraq, the “mission 
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accomplished” exuberance disappeared, with even Bush acknowledging in 2007 that the 
occupation had brought “a tragic escalation of sectarian rage and reprisal that continues to 
this day”(Bush 2007). In light of Dick Cheney’s 2008 statement that the invasion was “a 
difficult, challenging but nonetheless successful endeavour”, it seems reasonable to argue that 
the Bush administration fell victim, at least in part, to its own ‘reality deficit’ in Iraq. 
 
In such a context, a reclamation of ‘reality’ seems nothing if not realistic. Yet, something 
important is missed in the rush to accept membership of the “reality based community.” The 
easy dismissals of the Bush advisor obscure the extent to which his comments expressed an 
idea once central to the left: the possibility that political action can transform reality. Today, 
few on the left still believe it is possible to alter the entire terrain on which political action 
would once have been judged ‘unrealistic’. The portrayal of the aide’s comments as irrational 
illustrates the extent to which those who once believed in the transformative capacity of 
political action have succumbed to a pragmatic realism that finds its most recent domestic 
expression in Rudd’s positioning of the ALP as the party of the ‘reforming centre.’  
 
As we begin to survey the wreckage left behind by the neocons, it may be worth examining 
not only what they bequeathed to the world, in their ferocious attempt to transform our 
reality, but also how it was that they were able to come to ascendancy. Today, many of the 
dreams, and the concepts, that once sustained faith in social transformation lie in tatters. 
Firstly, the ideology of progress has been undermined by the very history that was supposed 
to lead inexorably to a more humane world. After the Nazi death camps, the disillusionment 
with the idea that technological progress necessarily heralded social progress was captured 
starkly in Theodor Adorno's remark, “No universal history leads from savagery to humanity, 
but one indeed from the slingshot to the H-bomb”(1973, p. 315). This realization had a 
profoundly demoralizing effect on a left that could no longer conceive of its goals as the 
goals of history itself. In this sense, George W. Bush was correct when he argued, in 2002, 
“the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress”? (Bush 2002) As 
the neocons set about imposing their own model of ‘progress’ on the world, they did so in the 
genuine belief, by then discarded by most on the left, that history was on their side. 
 
Our time is marked by more than the failure of progressive narratives however. Almost two 
decades ago, the Berlin Wall was reduced to rubble; today, its shards are packaged into small 
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glass jars, sealed with cork stoppers, and sold to tourists on the streets of a unified Berlin. 
And yet, the collapse of communism still haunts our political reality. If communism were 
only a wall, a collection of authoritarian states, or a teleological conception of history, the 
profound effect of its loss would be incomprehensible. Communism was all those things. It 
was also the dream of a better world that gave strength to those who struggled amidst the 
brutality and the grinding drudgery of this one. It was an organisational form that united 
people across oceans, a form of historical memory that allowed the defeats and victories of 
the past to live in the present, and a source of political futurity. Only by understanding the 
contradictory nature of this loss can we understand how we have lost the belief that political 
action can transform our reality.  
 
As the wall crumbled, the right took the offensive, claiming as its own not only the rhetoric 
of progress but also the belief that the world could be re-made. “Until now, the world we’ve 
known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and 
cold war,” George Bush senior announced two years after the collapse of the wall. “Now, we 
can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a 
new world order”(Bush 1991). 
 
A year after Bush senior's New World Order speech, then US Under Secretary of Defence 
Paul Wolfowitz, drafted a document that advocated US interventions throughout the world to 
“encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic 
systems”(2003). Even amidst the new world order hype, Wolfowitz's document – which 
suggested the US should “retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively 
those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which 
could seriously unsettle international relations”(2003) – was rejected as too extreme.  
 
With the election of George W. Bush administration, Wolfowitz's manifesto was revived to 
underpin the doctrine of “regime change”, which asserts the right of the US to wage wars to 
depose sovereign governments and remake political systems. The neo-cons, it seemed, still 
believed it possible to radically re-make the world. As former Trotskyist Christopher Hitchens 
explained of his alignment with US power; “I feel much more like I used to in the 1960s, 
working with revolutionaries” (Wolfowitz 2003). 
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As the neocons forcefully remodelled the world, their ‘war on terror’ eroded liberal 
democracy, which has given way to a form of state power that is neither liberal nor 
democratic. While the contours of liberalism’s replacement are still undefined, a discourse of 
permanent emergency has enabled the introduction of counter-terror measures that undermine 
central elements of the liberal rule of law, from freedom of speech to habeas corpus to the 
presumption of innocence.  
 
Some random examples: 
• Millions of people around the world rally against the war on Iraq. Their voices are 
ignored – they watch, powerlessly, as the bombs fall. 
• Counter-terror laws allow for control orders that subject people to home detention, 
prohibit them from speaking to certain other people, and compel them to wear 
tracking devices, with no requirement to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” an 
involvement in terrorism. 
• After five years in Guantanamo Bay, David Hicks confesses to aiding a terrorist 
organisation. His ‘confession’ reads like a speech at a Stalinist show trial.  
And so on. 
 
Wartime emergency measures are nothing new. And yet the representation of the war on 
terror as a war without temporal limits – Dick Cheney infamously suggested it “may never 
end. At least, not in our lifetime” – provides little basis for believing liberal democracy will 
be restored unscathed in the future (Dougherty 2001). Barack Obama has inherited a status 
quo in which, in Walter Benjamin’s words, “the state of emergency in which we live is not 
the exception but the rule.”(2003, p. 392) What he will do with this reality largely remains to 
be seen. While early promises to close Guantanamo and abandon those military tribunals he 
called an “enormous failure” were reassuring, the more recent suggestions that these tribunals 
will be retained, and that those responsible for authorising torture will not be brought to 
justice are indicative of how much emergency measures have insinuated themselves into the 
very structure of the US state (Pilkington 2009, p. 15).  
 
While all of this may call for a radical critique of liberal democracy, the erosion of liberalism 
has profoundly destabilised those who have seen themselves as its radical critics. Anatole 
France's remark about the abstraction of liberal categories of rights and legal equality – “poor 
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and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under the bridges” (Anatole France quoted 
in Benjamin 1985, p. 151) – once marked out the chasm separating a liberal world view from 
a politics that sought not the management of injustice through a system of formal juridical 
equality, but the overthrow of a system founded on substantive inequality.   
 
Today, however, when the alternative seems to include everything up to the use of torture as 
a legitimate tool of state, liberal democracy seems, perhaps, the ‘least-worst’ system. As the 
re-election of the ALP here, and the demise of the neocons in the US foster hopes for an end 
to the onslaught on civil rights that characterised the neocon era, any criticism of liberal 
democracy begins to appear untimely, perhaps even treacherous. 
 
Wendy Brown has suggested that while the death of communism is like the death of a 
beloved, the loss of liberal democracy is “like the loss of a hated but needed father”(Brown 
2006, p. 25). The demise of the familiar, yet contradictory, enemy that was liberalism seems 
to generate the temptation for radicals to step into the costume of the departed adversary, 
abandoning critiques of capitalism in the process. The belief that the discourse of rights, rule 
of law and due process offers the greatest advantage in what is conceptualised in advance as a 
purely defensive struggle, is underpinned by the assumption that it is no longer possible to 
change the world in any substantial way.  
 
To escape our current impasse, we must find the courage to rethink the fundamental 
assumptions of liberalism, and of a political practice centred on progress, sovereignty and 
right[s]. In 1938, Walter Benjamin wrote of the need to develop concepts “completely 
unusable for the purposes of Fascism”(Benjamin 1999). Two years later he was dead, killing 
himself after border guards refused him passage across the border to Spain as he sought to 
escape the Nazis. The stakes in his attempt to develop new concepts could not have been 
higher.  
 
Today, we too face the urgent need to develop a conceptual apparatus adequate to 
contemporary problems. Such critical thought, as Benjamin understood, is not a luxury to be 
saved for times of peace or subordinated to political pragmatism. Faced with the 
destabilization of familiar political categories, we need to ask what effects these categories 
produced, and what other political possibilities they foreclosed. If we simply defend 
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liberalism on its own terms, we abandon too easily a Left critique of liberal democracy that 
retains all its past validity. 
 
Today, we need to ask why the rhetoric of liberalism, in which opposition to contemporary 
counter-terror measures has largely been framed, has proved so useful to those waging the 
war on terror, a conflict increasingly cast as a war for liberal values – for ‘democracy’, 
‘human rights’, and the ‘rule of law’. To fail to do so would be to miss the connection 
between familiar liberal concepts and the newer political project of neo-conservativism. 
 
In a ‘war’ of a thousand battlegrounds, a war without spatial or temporal limitation, the 
categories of liberalism have provided coherence to a narrative which recasts the ‘war on 
terror’ as a civilizing mission. In Iraq, for instance – in the wake of the Coalition's inability to 
produce evidence of either weapons of mass destruction or Al Qaeda links – ‘democracy’, 
‘human rights’ and the ‘rule of law’ provided retrospective justification for the war and 
occupation. Following the announcement that Saddam Hussein would be executed for his 
role in the killings of 138 Shiites from the town of Al Dujail – the only charge he faced in 
which the United States was not directly implicated – John Howard claimed “[t]here's 
something heroic about a nation that is going through all the pain and difficulty as Iraq 
is,[sic] yet still struggles to give this monster a fair trial – that is the mark of a country that 
desperately wants democracy”(John Howard quoted in AAP 2006b). Bush likewise relied on 
a familiar distinction between tyranny and legality, referring to Saddam’s trial as “a milestone 
in the Iraqi people’s effort to replace the rule of a tyrant with the rule of law”(George W. 
Bush quoted in AAP 2006a).  
 
Of course, there’s room today for an immanent critique, which questions the democratic 
credentials of those who would export democracy by force, and reminds them of their fervent 
commitment to the rule of law each time they introduce a domestic law enabling detention 
without trial. Yet, as rights discourses morph into demands for greater security measures – to 
ensure the primary “right to security” – and ‘democracy’  and the ‘rule of law’ are used to 
justify bombings and military occupation, we need to recognise that imperial wars have 
always relied on liberal categories: the First World War was, after all, also the ‘Great War for 
Civilisation’. 
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What we are seeing today is not simply a corruption of these categories, but an expression of 
contradictions already present in liberalism, a system which presupposes a state capable of 
maintaining social order. This means it is crucial to resist the blackmail that suggests that to 
critique the rule of law, or liberal democracy, would be to undermine the struggle against the 
real, neoconservative, enemy . Today, we must begin the critical work of developing new 
political concepts adequate to a struggle to transform our political reality – concepts that will 
only arise in struggle against this reality. It may be that the possibility for such political 
innovation can be traced to the same source as the demoralization. Giorgio Agamben has 
argued: 
 
The fall of the Soviet Communist Party and the unconcealed rule of the capitalist-
democratic state have cleared the field of the two main ideological obstacles 
hindering the resumption of a political philosophy worthy of our time: Stalinism 
on one side, and progressivism and the constitutional state on the other (2000, p. 
109). 
 
Both of these were forms that anchored political imagination to the state. If we are to grasp 
the possibilities generated by the exhaustion of Stalinism and liberalism, we must do without 
nostalgia and sentimentality, and begin to develop a political praxis that no longer 
presupposes the continuing existence of the state. As long as we continue to rely on statist 
political categories, we will find our resistance recuperated into the project of re-
consolidating state power. If our time is to produce new political concepts, this will not occur 
in a realm of pure thought, or within a university system that is increasingly subjected to a 
neoliberal political rationality. The creation of new political concepts entails praxis, and will 
require the courage to act and to experiment politically in the face of an uncertain future. This 
means acting without teleological certainty, without a pre-formulated political alternative, 
and without guarantees.  
 
Yet true political action always lacks guarantees – a point obscured by the myth of progress. 
To act politically is to act without knowing the results in advance, precisely because true 
political action, as the Bush administration understood well, can transform the very terrain on 
which its consequences are evaluated. In this sense, to act politically is truly to “demand the 
impossible”, as every political act contains the potential to make what seemed impossible 
possible. To demand the impossible requires imagination and bravery. Our time is not 
especially conducive to either. Under the Bush administration, the mantra “there is no 
alternative” served to vanquish political imagination, while the policy of preemption 
colonized the future, and high-profile terror raids foster – unevenly distributed – fear.  
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If today we are offered not the assertion that there are no alternatives, but a discourse of 
audacity and hope, this is not without significance. It is up to us, however, to ensure that 
these words reverberate in struggle, rather than wearing thin, and ultimately generating 
cynicism, in the face of ‘realistic’ compromises. It is still necessary to act – now more so than 
ever – because, despite all that was revolutionary about the neocon's political project, the 
transformation they brought about had one aim: to ensure the world would never change 
again, to destroy any future challenge to the global ascendancy of capital or to US military 
dominance, extending both into perpetuity. If we are to refuse them their (belated) victory, if 
we are not to acquiesce to a world that destroys both courage and imagination in the name of 
security, we must firstly challenge ourselves to think, and to act, against reality.  
 
An earlier version of this essay was published in Overland 188, Spring 2007.  
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